Chapeau
17670/21
Athletics South Africa c. Switzerland
Décision no. 17670/21, 05 octobre 2021
Regeste
DÉCISION D'IRRECEVABILITÉ de la CourEDH:
SUISSE: Art. 34 CEDH. Qualité de victime de la fédération sud-africaine d'athlétisme (ASA) pour se plaindre de violations alléguées de l'art. 8 CEDH et de l'art. 14 combiné avec l'art. 8 CEDH.
Pour que la requérante puisse se prétendre victime d'une violation de la Convention, il doit exister un lien suffisamment direct entre elle et la violation alléguée. La notion de victime est interprétée de façon autonome et indépendante des règles de droit interne, telles que l'intérêt ou la qualité pour agir. En l'espèce, bien que le Tribunal fédéral ait reconnu la qualité pour recourir de la requérante pour contester le "Règlement régissant la qualification dans la catégorie féminine (pour les athlètes présentant des différences du développement sexuel)", cette circonstance ne peut suffire à la considérer comme victime au sens de l'art. 34 CEDH. L'ASA n'est pas directement et personnellement victime de la violation de l'art. 8 CEDH et de l'art. 14 combiné avec l'art. 8 CEDH. La Cour conclut que la requête est incompatible ratione personæ avec les dispositions de la Convention (ch. 13-17).
Conclusion: requête déclarée irrecevable.
Synthèse de l'OFJ
(4ème rapport trimestriel 2021)
Droit au respect de la vie privée (art. 8 CEDH); interdiction de la discrimination (art. 14 combiné avec l'art. 8 CEDH et art. 14 combiné avec art. article 1 du Protocole n° 1), droit à la propriété (article 1 du Protocole n° 1); règlement de l'International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) imposant aux athlètes présentant des différences du développement sexuel l'obligation de prendre des contraceptifs afin d'abaisser leur taux de testostérone afin de pouvoir participer à certaines épreuves.
La requérante est l'organe directeur de l'athlétisme en Afrique du Sud. Sa requête est étroitement liée à la requête Semenya c. Suisse, introduite le 18 février 2021 et actuellement pendante devant la Cour. Mme Semenya est une athlète sud-africaine de niveau international, spécialisée dans des courses de demi-fond. En avril 2018, l'IAAF publia son nouveau règlement intitulé "Règlement régissant la qualification dans la catégorie féminine (pour les athlètes présentant des différences du développement sexuel)" (Règlement DSD). La requérante refusa d'accepter ce règlement qui, selon elle, l'obligea à subir des traitements hormonaux, avec effets secondaires encore mal connus, en vue de réduire son taux naturel de testostérone comme condition pour pouvoir participer dans la catégorie féminine lors d'une compétition internationale. Par sentence du 30 avril 2019, le TAS rejeta la requête d'arbitrage déposée en vue de contester la validité dudit règlement. Le 28 mai 2019, la requérante saisit le Tribunal fédéral d'un recours en matière civile. Par un arrêt du 25 août 2020, le Tribunal fédéral rejeta le recours, estimant que le règlement de l'IAAF constituait une mesure apte, nécessaire et proportionnée aux buts légitimes de l'équité sportive et du maintien de la "classe protégée". Le Tribunal fédéral a en outre reconnu à l'association requérante la qualité pour recourir. Devant la Cour, la requérante fait valoir que le règlement DSD impose une ingérence injustifiée et disproportionnée à l'intégrité physique, morale et psychologique de l'athlète, protégée par l'article 8 de la Convention. À la lumière de cette disposition, elle soutient également que Mme Semenya souffre d'une restriction injustifiée au droit d'exercer sa profession. Elle fait valoir une violation l'article 14, combiné avec l'article 8 CEDH au motif que le règlement DSD ne s'applique qu'aux athlètes femmes atteintes d'un DSD. Elle fait enfin valoir une violation de l'article 1 du Protocole n° 1, pris isolément ainsi que combiné avec l'article 14. La Cour a constaté que, bien que l'association requérante se soit vu reconnaître par le Tribunal fédéral la qualité pour contester le règlement DSD, cela ne suffit pas pour être considérée comme une victime aux fins de l'article 34 de la Convention. L'association requérante, en tant que personne morale, n'est pas une victime directe et personnelle des violations alléguées des articles 8 et 14, combinés avec l'article 8 de la Convention. Par ailleurs, la Suisse n'a pas ratifié le Protocole n° 1. Dès lors, l'association requérante ne peut se prévaloir de son article 1. Il en va de même du grief tiré de l'article 14 combiné avec l'article 1 du Protocole n° 1. Irrecevable (unanimité).
Faits
THIRD SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 17670/21
ATHLETICS SOUTH AFRICA
against Switzerland
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 5 October 2021 as a Committee composed of:
Dmitry Dedov,
President,
Peeter Roosma,
Andreas Zünd,
judges,
and Olga Chernishova,
Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 8 March 2021,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant association, Athletics South Africa, is an association established under South African law and based in Johannesburg. It is represented before the Court by Mr D. Maharaj, a lawyer practising in Johannesburg.
The circumstances of the case
2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant association, may be summarised as follows.
3. The applicant association is the regulatory authority of athletics in South Africa. Its application is closely linked to the case
Semenya
v.
Switzerland
, cited above, currently pending before the Court. Mokgadi Caster Semenya ("M.C. Semenya"), is a South African national. She is an international athlete, specialising in middle-distance races (800 to 3 000 metres). She has won several gold medals at Olympic Games and World Championships.
4. Having carried out a sex verification test after M.C. Semenya's victory in the women's 800 metre race at the 2009 World Championships in Berlin, the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) informed her that she was henceforth required to reduce her testosterone levels to below a certain threshold if she wished to continue competing in her preferred events at international athletics competitions.
5. M.C. Semenya stopped taking hormonal treatment following an interim ruling issued in the
Dutee Chand
case on 24 July 2015,
[1]
in which the Court of Arbitration for Sport (the "CAS") temporarily suspended the IAAF regulation then in force.
6. In April 2018 the IAAF issued new regulations entitled "Eligibility Regulations for the Female Classifications (Athletes with differences of sex development)" (the so-called "DSD Regulations"). These regulate the conditions that an implicated female athlete must meet in order to be able to participate in international running competitions in the "protected class women", over distances of 400 metres up to 1 mile.
7. M.C. Semenya contested the validity of the regulations before the CAS, jointly with the applicant association. The CAS dismissed both arbitration claims in a ruling of 30 April 2019.
8. The applicant association and M.C. Semenya then submitted a civil-law appeal to the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, alleging, in particular, discrimination on the grounds of sex and of sexual characteristics against female athletes with DSD compared to female and male athletes who do not have DSD.
9. This appeal was dismissed on 25 August 2020. The Swiss Federal Tribunal recognized the applicant association's standing to appeal. It held, in this regard, that as a member federation of IAAF, it was not only bound by the DSD Regulations but also had to cooperate with and support IAAF in implementing these regulations. It also had the obligation to inform the IAAF Medical Manager if it was aware or believed that a sportswoman was a "relevant athlete". In these conditions, it was necessary to recognise that the association had an interest worthy of protection distinct from that of the athlete. On the merits, the tribunal held,
inter alia
, that fairness in sport was a legitimate concern and a central principle of sporting competitions. It was one of the pillars on which competitions were based.
COMPLAINTS
10. The applicant association argues that the DSD Regulations impose an unjustified and disproportionate interference with the core of the right to the physical, moral and psychological integrity of the athlete, protected under Article 8 of the Convention. In light of that provision, the applicant association also argues that M.C. Semenya suffers from an unjustified restriction on exercising her profession due to the DSD Regulations that preclude her from competing at an international level.
11. Invoking Article 14, combined with Article 8, the applicant association observes that the DSD Regulations only apply to elite athletes who are women with a DSD. Insofar as they do apply neither to male athletes nor to elite female athlete without a DSD, the targeted group was discriminated against.
12. The applicant association finally argues that the more medal-winning athletes it licenses, the more funding it will receive from IAAF to train and develop its teams. Under the DSD Regulations, however, it cannot licence a targeted athlete unless that athlete complies with the medical treatment required. For these reasons, there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, taken alone as well as combined with Article 14.
Considérants
THE LAW
13. Regarding the complaints under Article 8, taken alone and combined with Article 14 of the Convention, the Court reiterates that under Article 34 of the Convention it may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. For an applicant to be able to claim to be a victim of a violation, there must be a sufficiently direct link between the applicant and the alleged violation. The concept of "victim" must be interpreted autonomously and irrespective of rules of domestic law such as those concerning an interest or capacity to act (see, in particular,
Association de défense des intérêts du sport v. France
(dec.), no. 36178/03, 10 April 2007; and
Tunnel Report Limited v. France
, no.
27940/07
, § 24, 18 November 2010).
14. Furthermore, according to the Court's settled case-law, "victim" status may be granted to an association or trade union only if it is directly affected by the measure complained of (see
Winterstein and Others v. France,
no.
27013/07
, § 108, 17 October 2013, and
Syndicat CFDT des services de
santé et des services sociaux de Côtes d'Or and Others v. France
(dec.), no.
11052/06
, 21 October 2008).
15. In the instant case the Court observes that, although the applicant association was recognised by the Federal Tribunal as having standing to challenge the DSD Regulations, this is not sufficient to be considered as victim for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention. The applicant association, as a legal entity, is not a direct and personal victim of the alleged violations of Articles 8 and 14, combined with Article 8 of the Convention (see,
National Federation of Sportspersons' Associations and Unions (FNASS) and Others v. France
, nos. 48151/11 and
77769/13
, § 95, 18 January 2018). The mere fact that it was, as a member federation of IAAF, bound by the DSD Regulations and had certain duties with a view to implanting them, is not sufficient to confer such status on it.
16. Furthermore, and in so far as the applicants' complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 may be considered raising issues in respect of its own situations, the Court observes that Switzerland has not ratified Protocol No. 1. Therefore, the applicant association cannot rely on its Article 1. The same applies to the complaint under Article 14, combined with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, considering that Article 14 has no independent existence and has effect solely in relation to "the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms" safeguarded by the other substantive provisions of the Convention and the Protocols (see, among many others,
Sahin
v. Germany
[GC], no.
30943/96
, § 85, ECHR 2003-VIII, or
Khamtokhu and Aksenchik v. Russia
[GC], nos. 60367/08 and
961/11
, § 53, 24 January 2017).
17. Accordingly, the application is incompatible
ratione personae
with the provisions of the Convention and Protocols and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
Disposition
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares
the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 4 November 2021.
Olga Chernishova Dmitry Dedov
Deputy Registrar President